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Abstract— This paper studies if and to which extent COVID-
19 epidemics can be controlled by authorities taking decisions
on public health measures on the basis of daily reports of swab
test results, active cases and total cases. A suitably simplified
process model is derived to support the controllability analysis,
highlighting the presence of very significant time delay; the
model is validated with data from several outbreaks. The
analysis shows that suppression strategies can be effective
if strong enough and enacted early on. It also shows how
mitigation strategies can fail because of the combination of
delay, unstable dynamics, and uncertainty in the feedback loop;
approximate conditions based on the theory of limitation of
linear control are given for feedback control to be feasible.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first outbreak of the COVID-19 [1] virus epidemic
took place in China, starting at the end of 2019, and has
since then caused a global pandemic with disruptive effects
on public health, social life, and the economy. The pandemic
will likely spark a large number of studies to understand its
behaviour and to determine effective control strategies.
A wide range of mathematical models have been proposed
to describe the dynamic evolution of epidemics, starting from
the seminal paper [2], and including a wide range of possibly
quite sophisticated models, see e.g. [3] for a comprehensive
review. The analysis of these models allows to predict the
evolution of the disease over time, its asymptotic behaviour
(e.g. endemic disease equilibria vs. eradication), and most
importantly how it depends on the model parameters.
Epidemiological models are widely used to design vacci-
nation and treatment strategy based on optimal control, see,
e.g. [4] and references therein. They can also be used to
design feedback vaccination strategies [5], or even feedback
strategies combining different actions such as vaccination,
treatment, and culling [6]. Some studies take into the account
the feedback effects of behavioural changes in the evolution
of an epidemic, see [7] and reference therein.
Most models employed to study control strategies are
formulated in terms of ordinary differential equations, e.g.
the classical SIR and SEIR models and their variants. In
some cases, time delays are also included in the model, to
account for the incubation time, see, e.g., [8], [9].
Detailed models of the COVID-19 outbreak have started
to appear in the literature. With reference to the outbreak in
Italy, [10] proposes an extension of the classic SIR model
with eight state variables, while [11] presents a spatially
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resolved model with nine state variables for each of the
107 provinces of the country. Both models confirmed the
appropriateness of the public measures taken by the Italian
authorities to contain the virus outbreak. A highly detailed
epidemiological model of the UK was used in [12] to predict
possible outcomes of the virus outbreak and to suggest the
adoption of a suppression policy.
The report [13] attempts to estimate the effects of non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs, i.e., public health mea-
sures) onto the relative reduction of the reproduction number
Rt of COVID-19, by applying Bayesian methods to data
from 11 European countries. Given the estimates of the initial
reproduction number R0, a reduction by at least 60-70%
or more is necessary to suppress exponential growth. The
main result of [13] is that lockdown leads to an average
reduction of Rt by 50%, school closure by 20%, other
measures around 10%. However, 95% confidence intervals
on the reduction factors are huge, e.g. 10% to 80% reduction
for lockdown, 0% to 45% reduction for school closure,
severely undermining their predictive power. This problem is
inherent to the requirement of a large enough data set to be
statistically significant, which requires to put countries with
very different social habits and very different interpretations
of the same measure (e.g. lockdown) in the same data set.
The use of feedback control theory has been advocated
early on as a powerful tool to support the management of the
COVID-19 outbreak [14]. Unfortunately, most of the existing
literature on the control of epidemics involvse vaccines or
treatments , which are currently not available for COVID-
19. Some innovative feedback control strategies have been
proposed in preprints at the time of this writing, e.g. [15],
which proposes a feedback mitigation strategy based on fast
lockdown cycles controlled by a supervisory loop, or [16],
advocating a strategy based on massive random testing.
The aim of this paper is to assess the controllability of the
COVID-19 outbreak, assuming that the decisions of public
health measures by the authorities are based on daily reports
of positive swab tests, active cases, and total cases. To
this aim, a suitably simplified model is presented, which is
specifically aimed at capturing the fundamental dynamics of
the process which is relevant for feedback control, which
turns out to be heavily affected by time delay.
The main result of the analysis is twofold. On one hand,
suppression strategies can be effective if enacted early on and
with strong enough measures. On the other hand, mitigation
strategies turn out to be infeasible if the reproduction number
is significantly higher than one, and are in any case limited
by the time delays in the feedback loop.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, a control-
oriented model of the epidemic is introduced and validated
against data from the outbreaks in different countries. In
Section III, the two above-mentioned strategies are analysed
in terms of feedback control. Section IV draws conclusions
from the control-theoretical analysis with some recommen-
dations for decision makers and future research.
II. MODELLING
A. Derivation of the model
Models of the COVID-19 epidemic such as those men-
tioned in Sect. I are based on first principles, in the sense
that their equations describe the time evolution of different
categories of subjects, based on the known mechanisms
of infection, recovery, and care of patients. However, their
behaviour is ultimately decided by the values of coefficients
that must be identified from experimental data, which is pre-
ciously scarce in the case of a new disease such as COVID-
19. The quality and homogeneity of data used to tune those
models are also often questionable: different countries adopt
different standards for swab testing, possibly changing them
over time; some data get lost because of clerical errors; some
countries or regions may report lower numbers than real
because of political pressures. Even bona-fide reports may
fail to provide reliable data, as revealed by the mismatch
between official COVID-19 deaths and additional numbers
of deaths on municipal records in previous years. The actual
effects of NPIs are still quite uncertain, see [13].
Public policies based on such models cannot thus be
applied blindly, but must be adapted and corrected based
on the observed outcome. Indicators used by public decision
makers include daily reports of a) new positive swab tests,
b) current number of infected subjects, and c) total number
of reported cases. The crucial question is then: is feedback
control feasible at all in such a system?
In order to answer this question, a suitably simplified
model of the epidemic is derived here to capture the fun-
damental dynamics that is relevant for the design of the
feedback policy, in particular the dynamic relationship be-
tween NPIs and the response of the three above-mentioned
indicators. The starting point is the basic SEIR model [3]
with the addition of a further compartment L:
dS
dt
= −βIS
N
(1)
dE
dt
=
βIS
N
− E (2)
dI
dt
= E − γI (3)
dL
dt
= γI − δL (4)
dR
dt
= δL (5)
were N is the total population, S is the number of Suscep-
tible individuals, E is the number of Exposed individuals,
that have caught the infection but are not yet infectious, I
is the number of Infectious individuals, L is the number of
subjects which are still iLl, but are no longer infectious due to
hospitalization, quarantine, or just because infected subjects
are mostly infectious during the first few days after the end
of the latency period [17].
The parameter β accounts for the likelihood of infection
per unit time;  is the inverse of the average latency time
before one becomes infectious, γ is the inverse of the average
time infectious subjects spend by actually infecting other
people, and δ is the inverse of the average time subjects
remain ill but without infecting others. Given the short time
spans involved and the relatively low mortality rate, deaths
and births can be neglected, as well as immigration and
emigration, that are restricted during the outbreak.
The features of the COVID-19 virus, coupled with the
unavailability of effective treatments at the time of this
writing, are such that allowing more than a few percent of the
population to be infected at any point in time is unacceptable,
as doing so would lead to a collapse of the public health
system, particularly with reference to the significant fraction
of infected subjects needing intensive care to survive the
acute respiratory syndrome that the virus can cause. This fact,
coupled with the fairly long recovery time (about one month),
means that even the worst outbreaks in Western Europe are
currently estimated to have infected less than 10% of the
population after a few months in the course of the epidemic.
This allows to consider S(t)/N ≈ 1 and get rid of Eq. (1).
In fact, a significant portion of the population may be not
susceptible a priori, e.g. due to genetic reasons. However,
absent any concrete evidence of this fact, the precautionary
principle suggest to consider the worst case S(t)/N = 1.
Assuming then a constant value of β, the three eigenvalues
of system (2)-(4) are −δ and the two roots p and r of
s2 + (+ γ)s− (β − γ) = (s− p)(s− r). (6)
If β > γ, there is one negative eigenvalue p and one positive
eigenvalue r. Assuming that the negative exponential mode
has already died out, the solution of (2)-(3) is then:
I(t) ≈ It(0)ert, (7)
E(t) ≈ βIt(0)
r + 
ert (8)
The doubling time of I(t) is Td = log(2)/r, while the
current reproduction number is given by Rt = β/γ [3].
An important factor in the COVID-19 epidemic is that
many infected subjects can be almost or entirely asymp-
tomatic, and yet be able to infect other people. The ratio
α between positive tested infectious subjects It(t) and total
infectious subjects I(t) is still largely unknown and believed
to range from 2 to 10; it also strongly depends on how
aggressive the testing policies are in a certain country. On
the other hand, knowing α is only necessary to determine
when the ratio S(t)/N starts being significantly less than
one, providing some degree of herd immunity. All other
important indicators, namely the mortality ratio, the ratio
of hospitalized subjects and the ratio of subjects requiring
intensive care, are referred to It(t).
Assuming that α is constant, one can use Eqs. (2)-(5) to
also describe the dynamics of the fraction of subjects that
are eventually tested positive through the various stages of
the disease, Et(t), It(t), and Lt(t).
In most cases, subjects are only tested after they show se-
rious symptoms, which happens on average τt days after they
have become infectious. The lab processing also introduces
a delay τr before reports are available. Although in principle
it is possible to provide the results of the test in a few hours,
the average reporting time is usually much longer because
of limited equipment availability, up to one week or more.
The NPIs mentioned earlier (lockdown, school closures,
etc.) reduce the rate of infection β, hence the current re-
production number Rt = β/γ. These measures are varied
and can be applied progressively. We can then assume that
the time-varying parameter β is in fact a function of a
representative manipulated variable u(t), with u indicating
the intensity of adopted public health measures on a scale
from 0 (no intervention) to 1 (full lockdown and isolation
of all individuals). The β(·) function is thus monotonously
decreasing from the value β0, when no social restrictions
are enforced, to zero, corresponding to the total isolation of
each person in the contry. Of course β is also a function
of other unknown factors d(t) that act as disturbances on
the system, e.g. mutations of the virus or changes in social
behaviour which are not directly mandated by the authorities.
Considerable uncertainty is involved in the estimation of the
effects of different interventions in terms of reduction of β
or, equivalently, of Rt, see [13], hence β(·) is also uncertain.
The control-oriented model can thus be formulated as a
state-space system with output delays:
dEt(t)
dt
= β(u(t), d(t))It(t)− Et(t) (9)
dIt(t)
dt
= Et(t)− γIt(t) (10)
dLt(t)
dt
= γIt(t)− δLt(t) (11)
dTt(t)
dt
= Et(t) (12)
Nr(t) = Et(t− τm) (13)
Ar(t) = Ir(t− τm) + L(t− τm) (14)
Tr(t) = Tt(t− τm), (15)
where β(u, d) is an uncertain function, , γ, δ are uncertain
constant parameters, τt, τr are uncertain parameters, and
τm = τt + τr is the overall measurement delay. A further
state variable Tt(t) was added to compute the cumulative
number of positive tested subjects.
The first measured variable of the process is the number
of new daily reported cases Nr(t), which is affected by
the overall delay τm. The second measured variable is the
number of reported active cases Ar(t), i.e. the number of
subjects for which a positive test report has been received
and a double negative test has not yet been issued to certify
their recovery. As τt and τr are similar (several days), 2τr ≈
τt + τr = τm, leading to Ar(t) = It(t− τm) + Lt(t− τm).
The third measured variable is the total cumulated number
of reported positive swab test reports Tr(t) = Tt(t− τm).
Note that the model (10)-(15) has a time delay on the
output equations. Since input/output dynamics only will be
considered in the next Section, an equivalent representation
could be used where the delay is applied to the input instead.
B. Validation and Tuning
The goal of the model is to describe the dynamic response
of the Nr(t), Ar(t), and Tr(t) indicators to the application
of NPIs by central authorities, described by changes in u(t).
Four outbreaks cases were selected, all characterized by step
changes of u(t) at the central government level, in order to
make the validation easier: China, with data taken from [1],
Italy, France, and the UK, with data taken from [18], which
reports data from national authorities.
In the case of Italy and UK, some partial restrictions were
introduced first, causing a noticeable delayed reduction of the
exponential increase rate of new cases, then a full lockdown
was prescribed, whose effect was to change the positive
exponential growth of new cases into a negative exponential
decay after some delay. We then assume that β = β0 at t = 0,
then β undergoes a step reduction to β = ρ1β0 at t = t1 and
a further step reduction to β = ρ2β0 at time t = t2. In the
case of China and France no NPIs were enforced before full
lockdown, yet a reduction of the exponential growth rate well
ahead of the effects of lockdown is clearly visible, possibly
due to social feedback effects or other disturbances. Two step
reduction were thus applied also in those cases.
The parameters of the model were tuned manually to
obtain a good fit with the available data. In particular, τm
is easily tuned to match the delay between the lockdown
and the peak of Nr(t), Rt = β/γ and ρ1 determine the
growth rates in the pre-lockdown behaviour of Nr(t), ρ2,
γ and  determine the shape and decay rate of the post-
lockdown behaviour of Nr(t). Tr(t) is the integral of Nr(t),
so fitting it helps refining the parameter tuning considering
the noisy nature of Nr(t), which is also affected by a weekly
oscillation due to repeating lab schedules. Finally, δ is tuned
to match the peak of active cases Ar(t), which is much wider
and delayed than the peak of Ir(t). A detailed error analysis
was not performed and could be the subject of future work
considering a more extensive data set; in any case, high
parameter accuracy is not required to support the analysis
that will be carried out in the next Section.
The values obtained for the four outbreaks are reported
in Table I. They are fairly consistent with each other and
are compatible with the ones reported in [11] and [18]. The
initial reproduction number R0 and the current reproduction
numbers R1 and R2 computed after each change of β are
reported, as well as the doubling times Td0 and Td1 of the
unstable mode before and after the first change of β, and
the maximum reproduction number Rl corresponding to the
controllability limit derived in Section III-B.4.
The validation results for the case of Italy are reported in
Fig. 1-2, to appreciate the degree of accuracy of the proposed
model. In a nutshell, the interplay between E and R accounts
TABLE I
MODEL PARAMETERS (TIME CONSTANTS IN DAYS)
Period β0 1/γ 1/ 1/δ t1, ρ1 t2, ρ2 R0 R1 R2 Td0 Td1 τm
China 18/01/2020 – 11/02/2020 1.6 2.5 5.0 N/A 0, 0.63 5, 0.160 4.0 2.5 0.64 2.5 4.3 12
Italy 22/02/2020 – 01/05/2020 1.3 3.1 4.3 33 2, 0.56 19, 0.205 4.0 2.5 0.82 2.6 5.2 9
France 28/02/2020 – 03/05/2020 1.3 2.9 5.0 29 2, 0.60 17, 0.195 3.8 2.28 0.74 2.8 5.3 12
UK 01/03/2020 – 10/05/2020 1.28 2.8 6.2 N/A 15, 0.65 25, 0.270 3.6 2.34 0.97 3.4 5.8 10
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Fig. 2. Italian outbreak validation: active and total reported cases
for the growth or decay of cases, depending on Rt; the E
compartment is essential to explain why Nr(t) does not drop
sharply, once the measurement delay has elapsed, when β is
sharply reduced; the I compartment is necessary to explain
the much slower dynamic response of active reported cases
Ar(t). The validation results of the other cases are reported
in the Appendix of an extended version of this paper [19]; the
Modelica code used to validate the models is also available
online [20].
III. CONTROL
The effects of the application of the two control policies
briefly outlined in the Introduction will now be analysed,
based on the model derived in the previous Section. The
title of this section may well be ”Respect the Unstable”,
as the famous 2003 Bode Lecture paper by Gunter Stein
[21]: feedback control strategies should not be applied light-
heartedly to unstable systems, particularly when large num-
bers of human lives are at stake.
A. Suppression
The suppression strategy can be brutally summarized in
the following terms: as soon as Ar(t) reaches a value As
which is scary enough to decision makers to overcome their
reluctance to disrupt the social and economic life of their
country, drastic containment measures are taken:
u(t) =
{
0, Ar(t) < As
u¯, Ar(t) ≥ As . (16)
If the threshold As is crossed at time ts and u¯ is large
enough, then β(u¯)/γ < 1 and thus r < 0. Assuming also
d(t) remains constant for t ≥ ts, Eqs. (9)–(11) form a homo-
geneous LTI system with three negative eigenvalues r, p, and
−δ. The actual number of eventually tested positive exposed
subject Et(t) will start decaying immediately; however, the
number of new daily reported infectious cases Nr(t) will
continue its exponential growth for τm days, before starting
to decay as well. The number of reported active cases Ar(t),
hence the required number of beds in hospitals and intensive
care units, will also stop increasing exponentially after τm
days, but will continue growing and peak much later, due to
the much slower time constant 1/δ, see, e.g., Fig. 2. Then,
states and outputs asymptotically approach the equilibrium
in the origin, that corresponds to the eradication of the virus.
The peak value of active cases Ap = maxAr(t) can be
computed by numerical integration of Eqs. (9)–(11) and (14).
The ratio M = Ap/Ar(ts) can be quite large, e.g. M = 8
for the Italian outbreak and M = 10 for the French outbreak.
Assuming that a fraction σ (about 4% in Italy) of active
cases requires intensive care, and that Nic intensive care beds
are available, a wise choice of As requires σAr(t) < Nic ∀t;
hence, As < Nic/σM . Political decision-makers without a
training in mathematical modelling may have difficulties in
understanding the role and magnitude of factor M and may
be caught by surprise once it is too late to act.
B. Mitigation
1) Policy statement: The basic idea of mitigation policies
is to manage the outbreak, in particular the trajectory of
Ar(t), in order to avoid overloading the public health system,
without trying to suppress it. This strategy was followed
until 16 March 2020 by the UK government, which aimed
at achieving herd immunity [22], and until at least 10 June
2020 by the Swedish government [23].
2) Mathematical formalization: The first step to enact
this strategy is to compute a reference control policy u0(t),
obtained by the application of suitable NPIs over time, whose
effects on β is accurately calibrated, leading to reference
trajectories N0r (t), A
0
r(t) and T
0
r (t) for the corresponding
dCFF
Nr°/Ar°/Tr°
CFB
u
P
u°
-
Nr/Ar/Tr
Fig. 3. Mitigation control architecture
indicators, respecting the constraint σA0r(t) < Nic. These
trajectories can be obtained by means of constrained optimal
control, using sophisticated models of the epidemic as in
[12], that are much more accurate and detailed than the
simple model presented in the previous Section.
The unstable nature of the state trajectories while r > 0
makes an open-loop implementation of this policy infeasible,
unless one wants to risk runaways that can cause the collapse
of the public health system. The reference trajectory should
rather be followed by adapting the public policy measures
u(t) in real time, based on the values of Nr(t), Ar(t), and
T r(t), which are constantly monitored by the authorities.
This corresponds in principle to closing a feedback loop to
stabilize the unstable reference trajectory, see Fig. 3.
3) Ideal Feedback controller design: The process model
(9)-(14) can be linearized around the reference trajectory at
time ta, obtaining a linear model with constant coefficients
except for the terms β(u0(ta), d(ta)) and
∂β(u0(ta),d(ta))
∂u ,
which depend on ta for non-trivial reference control tra-
jectories u0(t). For the sake of the subsequent analysis,
we assume that these parameters change over a time scale
which is much longer than the time scale of the closed-
loop system feedback response, a common assumption when
dealing with gain-scheduling control, and thus consider them
as constants, with the value they have at time ta around
which the feedback stability analysis is performed. The
transfer functions of the linearized process then reads:
∆Nr(s)
∆u(t)
=
µ(ta)(s+ γ)
(s− p(ta))(s− r(ta))e
−τms (17)
∆Ar(s)
∆u(t)
=
µ(ta)(s+ (γ + δ))
(s− p(ta))(s− r(ta))(s+ δ)e
−τms (18)
∆Tr(s)
∆u(t)
=
µ(ta)(s+ γ)
(s− p(ta))(s− r(ta))se
−τms (19)
where µ(ta) = 
∂β(u0(ta),d(ta))
∂u I
0(ta), and p(ta) and r(ta)
are the eigenvalues of system (9)-(10) linearized at t = ta
around the reference trajectory.
By making the very optimistic assumptions that the param-
eters , γ, δ, and τm are constant and perfectly known, that
the function β(u, d) that expresses the effects of public policy
decisions is perfectly known, monotonously decreasing and
smooth with respect to u, and that d(t) ≡ 0, one can design
the feedback controller CFB as a linear controller C(s) with
gain scheduling, that compensates for the nonlinearity of the
process gain, resulting in a linear and (approximately) time-
invariant loop dynamics. While doing so, one should also
account for an additional delay τc of 2 ÷ 4 days within
the controller, corresponding to the decision making and
implementation delay. Assuming one wants to use Nr(t) for
feedback control, the overall control law is thus:
u(t) = u0(t) +
1
µ(t− τc)uf (t− τc) (20)
uf (s) = C(s)
[
N0r (s)−Nr(s)
]
(21)
and the loop transfer function of the controlled system is
L(s) = C(s)
µr(s+ γ)
(s− p(t− τc))(s− r(t− τc))e
−s(τm+τc),
(22)
where µr is the ratio between the actual value of the gain
µ of transfer function (17) and its reference value used
for gain scheduling. In ideal conditions, µr = 1, though
results from [13] imply this gain is subject to significant
uncertainty. In case one wants to control Ar(t) or Tr(t),
similar consideration apply, using (18) or (19) instead of (17).
In all the three cases, the loop transfer function reveals
the very dangerous nature of this process, which features a
time delay τ , an uncertain gain µr, and an unstable pole with
time constant T if β(ta)/γ > 1, where
T =
1
r
=
Td
log(2)
(23)
τ = τt + τr + τc. (24)
Considering the values reported in Table I, Td = 4.3÷5.8
before lockdown, while τ = 9÷ 12 days.
4) Control feasibility: In order to guarantee some ro-
bustness of the system performance against the large gain
uncertainty of the process, the Bode plot of
∣∣L(jω)∣∣ should
maintain a roughly constant slope over a sufficiently wide in-
terval around the crossover frequency ωc, thus approximating
Bode’s ideal loop transfer function.
When Rt(t) > 1, hence r(t) > 0, the analysis reported in
[24], Sect. 4.6, leads to conclude that if one wants to limit
the maximum norm of the sensitivity function Ms < 2 to
achieve some robustness, the product of the unstable pole r
and of the time delay τ should be rτ < 0.156. Introducing
the doubling time Td, this condition becomes:
τ
Td
< 0.225, (25)
i.e., under very optimistic assumptions on the knowledge of
the process parameters, feedback control is feasible only if
the overall loop delay is less than a quarter of the doubling
time of the outbreak. Considering the values reported in
Table I, this limitation translates into Rt(t) < 1.1.
When Rt(t) < 1, hence r(t) < 0, [24] concludes that
the maximum crossover frequency is 1.57/τ ; hence, the
time constant of the response of the feedback controller to
unexpected disturbances cannot be less than T = τ/1.57.
Unfortunately there is no theorem that can be directly
invoked to prove that any feeback control policy would not
suffer from the same limitations of a carefully scheduled
linear controller. However, the results of this analysis pro-
vides an insightful benchmark, pointing out the crucial role
of measurement and decision delays, which should explicitly
be taken into account for feedback control design, and
minimized as much as possible. It also suggest that robust
feedback control may not be feasible around trajectories
where Rt is significantly above one. For example, this may
explain why the controllers discussed in [15] end up in
runaway scenarios with a non-negligible likelihood, when
taking into account the statistical distribution of the uncertain
process parameters.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Governments all the world over are faced with very chal-
lenging life-or-death decisions regarding the management
of the COVID-19 epidemic, involving the balance between
public health and economic issues. In order to take such
decisions, they rely on expert advice based on the results
of epidemiological mathematical models and on daily case
reports, based on swab test results.
This paper puts the problem under a control systems per-
spective, casting it as a feedback control problem, and using
a simple model that captures the control-relevant dynamic
response of those reports to the application of NPIs. The
model was tuned and validated with data from four different
outbreaks.
These are the main results of the analysis:
• The suppression strategy is effective if NPIs are strong
enough to obtain Rt < 1, but it requires to understand
the role of the multiplicative factor M to correctly
decide when it is the right time to enforce them.
• Mitigation strategies are limited by the combination of
delay, uncertainty, and unstable dynamics. In particular,
designing robust stabilizing controllers around trajecto-
ries with Rt > 1.1 is likely to be difficult or impossible.
Reducing the overall delay by 50% would bring the
limit to Rt > 1.2. This information is particularly
relevant for the management of the reopening phase
after lockdown.
• Measurement and decision delays play a crucial role
in determining the feedback control performance and
stability; hence, they should be explicitly taken into
account in the design of any feedback controller, and
minimized as much as possible, e.g., by promoting fast
testing policies and technologies.
• The analysis and design of public health policies can
benefit from the use of the the tools of control theory,
which may possibly suggest viable solutions or point
out shortcomings of proposed strategies, that are not
obvious to epidemiologists and physicians.
At the time of this writing, the emerging consensus
seems to be that the safest policy to address exponentially
growing COVID-19 outbreaks is to apply aggressive enough
suppression policies; the results reported in this paper can
further motivate why this is actually the case.
These results could also be useful to devise effective and
safe strategies to cope with the reopening phase that countries
face after successfully suppressing the first outbreak.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Detailed results of the model validation in the cases of
China, France, and UK are discussed in this appendix, which
does not fit the strict 6-page limit of IEEE Control Systems
Letters publications, and therefore is only made available in
the arXiv version of the paper.
A. China
Fig. 4 reports the validation of the Nr(t) trajectory for the
Chinese outbreak, based on data from [1].
The lockdown became effective on day 5 for the city
of Wuhan, which had the majority of cases at the time,
and on day 6 for all the Hubei region. Since it is not
possible from available data to figure out what are the
separate effects of two such very close events, the second
one was lumped together with the first one, which produced
the largest number of reported cases.
The data at the beginning of the time series until day
5 doesn’t really fit well an exponential curve, but that is
probably due to issues with the collection of swab test results.
However, the effect of the time delay τm is very clearly vis-
ible, as the number of new reported daily cases only stopped
growing exponentially after 12 days. The behaviour of Nr(t)
after the peak allowed to tune the γ and  parameters, and
to estimate a reproduction number Rt = 0.64 immediately
after the effect of lockdown was felt.
B. France
Fig. 5 reports the validation of the Nr(t) trajectory for the
French outbreak, based on data from [18].
As already mentioned in Sect. II-B, the doubling time
increased significantly after day 14, corresponding to a
change of β happened around day 2, given the delay τ = 12.
The cause of this change is unknown, it may actually have
been caused by some feedback effects on social behaviour
caused by the growing fear of contagion sparked by the
nearby Italian case. The trend of Nr(t) after the delayed
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Fig. 6. French outbreak validation: active and total reported cases
effect of the lockdown on day 17 is very noisy but clearly
decreasing on average. This is confermed by looking at the
very good match in the validation of the Tr(t) trajectory
reported in Fig. 6: as Tr(t) is the integral of Nr(t) (see
(15)), high-frequency noise is filtered out.
As to the trajectory of active cases Ar(t) shown in Fig.
6, the matching of the simulation results with the data is
very good for the first 25 days, then some mechanism seems
to have somewhat dampened the experimental curve more
efficiently than the model in this paper. In any case, the
model overestimates the peak value by around 15%, which
is not that bad, considering how simple the model is.
C. UK
Finally, we take into consideration the case of UK, again
using data taken from [18]. The virus was basically allowed
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Fig. 7. UK outbreak validation: new daily reported cases
to run unchecked until March 16, 2020 (day 15), when the
government issued some recommendations to avoid going to
pubs or theaters, without however closing them or issuing
any legally binding rules or restriction. This seems to have
slowed down the exponential growth after a 10-day delay,
increasing the doubling time from 3.4 to 5.8 days.
Full lockdown was announced on Mar 23 and went into
effect on Mar 26 (day 25). Also in this case, the effect on
Nr(t) was felt after a significant delay, in this case of about
10 days, see Fig. 7. Once that time interval was elapsed, the
number of new daily positive swab tests plateaued, instead of
starting to decay, settling down on a trajectory with estimated
Rt = 0.97, very close to the stability limit.
Also in this case, the experimental data about Nr(t) are
very noisy; however, an excellent match with data is obtained
with the cumulated Tr(t) trajectory, which is less sensitve
to nois because of the additional integral effect, see Fig. 8.
Unfortunately, data for Ar(t) were not available from [18],
so it was not possible to validate the active cases output in
this case.
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